White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 All of the claimants were police officers who had been on duty the day of the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster. Interestingly, in this instance, the courts decided that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to actually witness the incident. In this case, he categorized the victims in a psychiatric injury cases in to two main categories- the primary and secondary victims. On the otherhand, the defendant admitted that he was negligent in relation to the accident of the boy but he denied any kind of liability or duty of care towards the claimant as far as her psychiatric injury was concerned. 10 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police . Among all the claimants, thirteen people lost either their relatives or friends because of death. As soon as she arrived to the hospital, she was informed that her youngest daughter was killed. In the Irish context, a different policy approach has been adopted and it appears to be more difficult to recover damages in relation to nervous shock , the strict criteria which have been laid down clearly demonstrate this viewpoint. [57] A Selection Of Cases Illustrative of the English Law of Tort by Kenny, Courtney Stanhope: Fifth Edition. All of the aforementioned cases demonstrate clearly that claims relating to nervous shock are indeed highly complex and, in my opinion, some of the outcomes seriously flawed. In modern times, the issue of liability for nervous shock still remains a contentious issue. On that occasion the law lords removed any special rights of employees or . They brought an action against their employer for negligently causing psychiatric illness to them. The . At trial she was awarded damages for nervous shock. had introduced the Special Rule . Generally, the burden of proving such a close tie of love and affection lies with the person who wishes to establish a claim for psychiatric illness. He further took the view that, the cases where there is insufficient proximity of relationship must be very carefully considered before allowing the claimants for psychiatric injury claims[20]. In order to support this argument, the claimant relied on the decision of the case in In re Polemis and Furness, withy & Co. Ltd[47]. Firstly shock had to occur as a result of what the plaintiff witnessed from his / her unaided senses .This required that the plaintiffs be close to the event. 141. However, to satisfy the proximity of relationship with the primary victims might be considered a major obstacle for the secondary victims when there is an issue of establishing a claim for the psychiatric illness. In my view the only sensible general strategy for the courts is to say thus far and no further. Difficult point of law about the circumstances in which a defendant who owes a duty of care . D was under a duty to take reasonable steps to protect his employees from the risk of physical harm, but there was no extension of this duty to protect C from psychiatric harm when they were not exposed to any risk of physical injury. Moreover, a rescuer in relation to whom physical injury was not reasonably foreseeable could not recover damages for psychiatric injury sustained by witnessing, or participating in the aftermath of, an accident which had caused death or injury to others; such rescuers were to be categorised as secondary victims, and so would have to meet the conditions specified by Lord Oliver in Alcock. However, these two categories of secondary victims are exceptionally allowed to recover at common law even without a close tie of love and affection between them and the immediate victims, as required of other secondary victims. The House of Lords reversed the Court of Appeal decision in Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1997] 1 All ER 540, which had found that the plaintiffs were primary victims, as rescuers. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310. According to the facts of this case, the claimants (Robertson and Rough) and the primary victim (George Smith) used to work together with the defendants (Forth Road Bridge Board). Irish courts do not use space / time or relationship as limiting factors as applied in some of the previous English cases , but rather these factors are taken into account, although the position in relation to the latter may be changing as evident in Cuddy v May. Section A The codification of directors duties was an unnecessary step. C brought an action in negligence (and/or breach of statutory duty) against their employer, the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (D), for the psychiatric harm they had suffered as a result of witnessing the tragedy first-hand. It does not merely include the very accident that caused the death or injury to the primary victims but it also includes the immidiate aftermath of the accident[66]. The plaintiffs wife had been walking up the . Held: Psychiatric injury is a recognised form of personal injury, and no statute . . This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Frost (or White) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455. If you are the original writer of this dissertation and no longer wish to have your work published on the UKDiss.com website then please: Our academic writing and marking services can help you! complexities encountered by the court in Frost in applying the principles laid down by Alcock v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police14 and Page v Smith15 are also highlighted. . White (Frost) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 (Hillsborough, police on duty) The Control Mechanisms - Alcock 1. (back to preceding text) I am compelled to say that I am unable to accept this suggestion because in my opinion (1) the proposal is contrary to well-established authority; (2) the proposed control mechanism would erect an artificial barrier against recovery . She suffered serious nervous shock as a result and sued the defendant who was responsible for the accident. 5th Oct 2021 Both cars suffered considerable damage but the drivers escaped physical injury. Donaghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 532. The claim was rejected by the House of Lords on the basis that none of the claimants could be considered "primary . At common law a distinction is drawn between what is merely the ordinary emotion of grief, anxiety, fear and transient shock which does not constitute sufficient damage and the recognisable psychiatric illness that is established by expert medical evidence. The carriageway was too high that any person fell from that distance would unlikely to survive. In this instance police officers were seeking compensation on the basis that they had suffered psychiatric illness as a result of rescuing victims after the crush. Filters. The case centred upon the liability of the police for the nervous shock suffered in consequence of the events of the Hillsborough disaster . In that case it was not reasonably freseeable by the defendant that the claimant was going to suffer from psychiatric illness after witnessing the accident. The appointment of the former Deputy Chief Constable Lauren Poultney was approved at a . The requirement that the secondary victims must be physically present to the accident or its immediate aftermath was for the first time established by Lord Wilberforce in the case of Mcloughlin v O Brian[42] which subsequently had been approved by the House of Lords in the leading case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire[43]. Case Summary White v Chief Constable of the Yorkshire Police [1998] 3 WLR 1509. .Cited James-Bowen and Others v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis SC 25-Jul-2018 The Court was asked whether the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (the Commissioner) owes a duty to her officers, in the conduct of proceedings against her based on their alleged misconduct, to take reasonable care to protect them from . The requirement of establishing proximity of relationship with the primary victims is one of the criteria. The defendants resisted saying that the injury alleged, the development of pleural plaques, was yet insufficient as damage to found a claim. In the present case, despite of being present at the stadium during the football match the claimants whose action had been rejected by the House of Lords are as follows[25]: Brian Harrison was one of the appellants. Others identified bodies in temporary constructed morgues in the stadium. [1981] 1 All ER 809. In my opinion, this case illustrates a change of approach in relation to nervous shock recovery. The plaintiffs were not primary victims as they we were not within the range of foreseeable physical injury and their psychiatric harm was a result of . The plaintiff, Mr Smith was deemed to be a primary victim, since he was involved in the accident and risked personal injury. where the rescuer may not have been in physical danger but was awarded damages due to his putting himself in the 'zone of danger', after the event. The lead case on secondary victim claims is Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] which sets out a 4-stage test known as the control mechanisms. No plagiarism, guaranteed! Once the requirement of proximity of relationship is satisfied, the secondary victims must also establish the facts that he had physical proximity to the accident or its immediate aftermath. Cases Referenced. It was agreed between the parties that the only issue was whether they could satisfy the criterion of . . Prior to the Page v Smith case it was assumed that reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric illness was required in all cases of negligently inflicted psychiatric illness and that all such plaintiffs must be persons of normal disposition.. Although, there was a rebuttable presumption that, in some cases, the close tie of love may exist between the engaged couples which might be even stronger than that of the married couples. [41] Kay Wheat (2003) Proximity and Nervous Shock Common Law World Review 32 4 (313). Dulieu v White and Sons (1901) 2 K.B. However, subsequently Lord Lloyd in the case of Page v Smith[13]further emphasized upon the distinction between the primary and secondary victims. [1996] AC 923 , HL(E) and Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Refuge intervening) [2015] AC 1732 , SC(E) considered. This case raised two principal questions. In this instance, mental illness was accompanied by a physical trauma i.e. After the dismissal from the Court of Appeal, ten of the claimants made an appeal to the House of Lords against the decision given by the Court of Appeal. However, during the journey, a very strong wind thrown the metal sheet and Smith away while he was sitting on top of it. !L /Length 13 0 R The injuries were psychiatric, being suffered when they witnessed a crash from the ground. Hicks v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 2 All ER 65. not medically recognised condition: fear, it is a normal emotion; . So the defendant submitted that, since the claimant was not present at the place where the accident took place, his action against the defendant should not be allowed by the court. Take a look at some weird laws from around the world! In favour of this argument the claimant relied on the decision given by the House of Lords in the case of Hambrook v Stokes Bros[46]. [7] Again, Hoffman L.J in the case of Page v Smith[8] defined psychiatric illness as a mental trauma. [1953] 1 All ER 617 at page 621. The courts in different cases have recognized different type of psychiatric illnesses. All of them were connected in various ways . Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1995 . endstream endobj startxref In order for the claimant to successfully recover compensation the court needs to consider an amalgam of rules and exceptions as well as different categories of claimants, which . The law has imposed lots of requirements for the secondary victims before they can successfully make a psychiatric injury claim. (White (Frost) v Chief Constable of S Yorks, pp 500 and 511) The Clinical Negligence cases 1. He took the view that, there was no negligence on the part of Keith Keel but the defedant was negligent and committed a breach of his duty of care. Different kinds of harm The horrific events of 15 April 1989 at the . The victims were taken to the nearest hospital by that neighbour. So, finally it was held by the majority of the Court of Appeal that the defendant owed no duty of care to the claimant even though her psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable. It was the case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire,[11]where Lord Oliver for the first time drew the attention to the distinction between the primary and secondary victims. Although the boy arrived home eventually but his mother suffered from a nervous shock[45]. Appeal from White, Frost and others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire and others HL 3-Dec-1998 No damages for Psychiatric Harm Alone The House considered claims by police officers who had suffered psychiatric injury after tending the victims of the Hillsborough tragedy. [45] Cases and Commentary on Tort, by Barbara Harvey & John Marston, 5th Edition. Similarly there are some other cases where the claimants were not actually present at the scene of the accident but the court still held the defendant liable for negligently inflicting psychaitric injury to the claimants. Another appellant, namely Mr. Robert Alcock, was present in the stadium and lost his brother in law but still failed in his action as it was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendants that he would suffer psychiatric illness. He went on stating that, due to the policy considerations, the arguments against there being a duty of care prevails over the arguments in favour of being there such a duty of care. They claimed that because they were rescuers they should be treated as primary victims. It was argued that the defendants had failed to take adequate precautions to protect the plaintiff. The mother came across the tricycle which was lying underneath the taxicab but failed to see the boy. He was told however that the risk was very remote. Held: . %PDF-1.2 The House of Lords in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police clarified that rescuers are not a special category of primary victim. Looking for a flexible role? Essential Cases: Tort Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. The claimants, as secondary victims, had to satisfy the criteria for the imposition of liability formulated by the House of Lords in McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 and Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] AC 310. This took place while Robertson was driving the van on a carriageway which was high above the water. Study with Quizlet and memorize flashcards containing terms like Define primary victim, Define secondary victim, What was the initial definition of psychiatric damage and more. ~M}o"bR[ A\euA. Appeal from - White, Frost and others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire and others HL 3-Dec-1998. Both these two cases which involved the plaintiff being exposed to asbestos highlight the strictness of the Irish law in respect to such claims. He continued that, the claimants nervous shock was too remote as a head of damage. The first is to wipe out recovery in tort for pure psychiatric injury. The Court of Appeal in Frost v Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police [1997] 3 WLR 1194 (by a majority) had held that the police officers who were allowed to recover for their psychiatric illness as a result of carrying out their professional duties as rescuers and/or employees at the disastrous Hillsborough football stadium stampede were classifiable as primary victims. Both cars suffered considerable damage but the drivers escaped physical injury. Held: (Smith LJ dissenting) The . Consequently, actions brought by the potential claimants or the victims of psychiatric illness have often been unsuccessful for a number of reasons despite of having been suffered genuine recognized psychiatric injury[1].